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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED Oy APPEAL
1.

Was the Appellant injured ih the course of her

employment or arising

from her employmeint as a matter of

law?
2.

Should the definition of "course of employment"

which has arisen in workmen's compensation cases be applied
in negligence cases to prevent an injured person from recovering damages?
3.
employee

Should the Appellant be barred from suing a co-

for negligence merely because the accident which

gave rise to this litigation occurred on \\er employer's premises?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This

case

is

an

Honorable John Wahlquist
Court

of

granted
which

Weber

resulting

judgment

brought
from

of

County.

summary
she

appeal

an

from

an

Order

the Second

Judicial

Specificallyf

Judge

and

against

dismissed

the

by

District
Wahlquist

Appellant's

respondent

automobile-pedestrian

the

for

case

injuries

accident.

Judge

Wahlquist1s Order and the Findings of F^ct and Conclusions
of Law are attached to this brief in the Addendum.
STATEMENT, OF FACTS
Appellant and Respondent are both federal employees
who work at the Defense Depot Ogden. F.F|. f p_«2*

On October

17, 1984, the Appellant parked her automobile in the parking
lot at the DDO where she worked. F.F. ,p«|2.

She exited her

vehicle and attempted to walk to the buillding in which she
worked.

F.F.,p.2
The Respondent

had

arrived

mately the same time F.F.,p^2.
ing

lot

his

vehicle

for

work

at approxi-

As he drovp through the park-

struck

the

Appellant.

F.F.,p.3.

Appellant was injured as a result of the collision. F.F., p.3.
At the time of the accident, neither the Appellant
or

Respondent

had

"punched

in" or

actually

reported

for

work, F.F. ,p. 3, nor were they being paid for the time they
spent in the parking lot. F.F.,p.3
Appellant

has

received

-1-

Federal

Worker's

Compensation

Benefits

from

Compensation. Administration.

the

Federal

Employees

F.F.,p.3

The accident occurred on the employer's premises.
For purposes of the Motion for Summary Judgment, whether or
not there was negligence is immaterial. F.F.,p.2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Briefly, Appellant argues that it was error for the
trial court to hold that "course of employment" as defined
in workmen's compensation cases should be applied to negligence

cases.

This

is

the

case

because

"course

of

employment" has been broadly and/or liberally construed to
help injured workers obtain compensation.

Consequently,

this language should not automatically be applied in other
types of litigation (i.e., negligence cases) to prevent an
injured party from recovering damages in a negligence case.
Some other states define course of employment liberally in workmen's compensation cases. However, they apply
a less broad definition in negligence cases.
some negligence lawsuits to proceed.

This allows

Appellant argues that

this court: should also define "course of employment" differently in a negligence case.
This will necessitate reversal of the trial court's
ruling and order.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
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THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION DEFINITION OF
"COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT" SHOULD NOT BE
APPLIED TO NEGLIGENCE CASES
Utah's

Workmen's

Compensation

Statute

(U.C.A.

35-1-45) provides that employees who suffer an injury within
the

course

of

their

employment

or

arising

out

of

their

employment can only claim worker's compensation benefits as
their sole and exclusive remedy.

A recertt Utah case inter-

preting this law has held that any injuty which occurs on
the employer's premises to an employee i$ within the course
of employment.

Soldier Creek Coal y. Bfeiley, 22 U.A.R. 9

(Utah, 1985).
Respondent contended

since this| accident occurred

in a parking lot on the premises of the defense Depot Ogden
that workmen's compensation was the Appellant's only remedy
for her injuries.

The trial court accepted this contention

and granted the Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The basic question that this li|tigation raises is
whether this Court should apply the standard of "Course of
Employment"

which

has

evolved

cases to negligence cases.

in

workmen's

compensation

It is the Appellant's contention

that it was error for the trial court to Automatically apply
the same standard conclusion.

The Court Stated:

The clear intention of our legislature was to "substitute a more humanitarian and economical system of compensation
for injured workers or their dependents
in case of their death" which the more
humane and moral conception of our time
requires. [36 P.2d at 981]
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In

North

Beck

Commission, 200 P. Ill

Mj.ni.r12

(Utah,

Company

y^

Industrial

1921 ) the court stated the

following:
The Industrial Act, ... must be liberally construed and with the purpose of
effectuating its benficient and humane
objects. [200 P. at 112]
In Wilstead y^ Industrial Commission, 407 P.2d 692
(Utah, 1965) the Utah Supreme Court stated that:
The purposes which underlie the
workmen's compensation act are: to assure
to the injured employee and his dependents an income during the period of his
total disability and to provide compensation for any resulting permanent disability; to accomplish this by a simple and
speedy procedure which eliminates the
expense delay and uncertainty in having
to prove negligence on the part of the
employer; and to thus require industry to
bear the burden of the injuries suffered
in it. [407 P.2d at 693]
The prior cases show that the court has attempted
to LIBERALLY CONSTRUE the workmen's compensation statute to
provide coverage for an injured employee when possible.
It

logically

follows

that

the

"course

of

employment" has been defined as broadly as it has been to
enable

injured

workers

who

would

otherwise

claim workmen's compensation to do so.

be unable

to *

Further, it must be

conceded that this term has indeed been broadly defined.

If

mere presence anywhere on an employer's premises constitutes
being within course of employment, the phrase is an extremely broad one indeed!

-4-

It is a mistaKe for a court tb take this broad
phrase defined in workmen's compensation cases and to apply
it automatically in other types of lawsuilts.

In this case,

rather than aiding an injured person in recovering damages
it has had the opposite effect.

Here, it has resulted in

the dismissal of an injured person's suit for damages.
Other courts in other states h$s considered this
issue. *1 Two rules have developed.

One rule automatically

applies the "scope of employment" to standard as it developed in workmen's compensation cases to negligence cases.**2
The other rule defines "scope of employment" differently in
negligence cases than in workmen's compensation cases.
Appellant contends that the rulfe which requires a
different definition of "scope of employment" in negligence
cases is the one which should be adopted by this court as
Utah law.

Such a rule may not be simple, but justice and

simplicity do not always run together.
In

McNaughton

v^

Si-ms^

147

SE2d

631

(South

Carolina, 1966) the South Carolina Supreme Court held that
scope of employment standard in a negligence case would' be

*1

- This issue appears to be one of firbt impression in Utah.

**2 - See Mast v. Rogers, 254 NE2d 179 (Illinois, 1969). Bagley
v. Gilbert, 428 NYS2d 737 (New York, 1980). Eisnaugle
v. Booth, 226 NE2d 259 (West Virginia, 1976)
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different than that in a tort case.

Here, plaintiff was

involved in a collision in her employer's parking lot.
accident occurred after working hours.

The

The South Carolina

Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was not barred by
South Carolinafs Workmen's Compensation Act from suing a coemployee who caused the accident for negligence.
Another

South

Carolina

case

is

instructive.

Williams v. gebbington, 146 SE2d 853 (South Carolina, 1966).
Here, the plaintiff was struck by a car driven by a fellow
employee.

The accident occurred on company property, but

prior to the start of work.

The South Carolina Supreme

Court held that a co-employee would only be immune from a
negligence suit when it could be shown he was performing
work for his employer.

Since this was not occurring in this

case, the plaintiff was allowed to sue the co-employee for
negligence.
In Molino y^ Asher, 588 P.2d 1033 (Nevada, 1979),
the Nevada Supreme Court considered this same issue.

Here,

an employee parked her car in an employer's parking lot as
she prepared to go to work.
cle causing injury.
gence.

A co-employee struck her vehi-

She sued the co-employee for negli-

The Nevada Supreme Court held that the employee

could maintain a negligence suit against the co-employee
despite Nevada workmen's compensation

law.

A different

standard for scope of employment in negligence suits was the

-6-

basis of the ruling.
In Ward y^ Wright^ 490 SW2d 223 (Texas, 1973) the
Texas

Civil

Appeals

Court

reached

the

same

conclusion.

Here, another employee was injured by a co-employee on the
employer's parking lot.

The Texas Court Allowed the injured

employee to sue his co-employee for negligence despite the
Texas Workmen's Compensation Statute.
In Beajrd v^ Brown^ et a l ^ 616 P. 2d 726 (Wyoming,
1980) this same issue was decided.

Herp, an employee was

traveling to work when he negligently caused an automobile
accident.

Suit was brought against his Employer, the R. L.

Frailey Company.

The trial court held th^t the employee was

within the scope of his employment.
against the employer.

Judgment was entered

The employer appealed.

The Wyoming

Supreme Court held that while the employee might have been
within the scope of employment

for purposes of workmen's

compensation, he was not in the scope of employment for the
purpose of negligence lawsuit.

The Wyoming Supreme Court

stated:
By saying this, we do not intend to overrule or limit in any way the holdings of
those cases.
It is sufficient to point
out that they are all worker's Compensation cases and, as such, their holdings
are not generally applicable in the negligence area. [616 P.2d at 736]
Finally, in MeIvor y^ Savage, 33 Cal. Rptr. 740
(California, 1963), the California Court of Appeals reached
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this same conclusion.
another

co-employee

employer.

Here, the plaintiff was injured by
in

a

parking

lot

owned

by

their

The injured employee sued the co-employee for

negligently injuring him.

The co-employee defended on the

basis that the injured employee's sole and exclusive remedy
for the injury was workmen's compensation.

The trial court

granted summary judgment for the co-employee.
employee

appealed.

The injured

On appeal, the California Court of

Appeals reversed the trial court and ruled that the injured
employee could sue for negligence.

The court held that sim-

ply because the injured employee had collected workmen's
compensation benefits was no reason to dismiss his negligence lawsuit.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
DEFINITION OF
"COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT" IN THIS CASE AND
THEREFORE THE TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF
THIS LAWSUIT MUST BE REVERSED.
In the instant case, the failure of trial court to
apply a different definition of "course of employment" in
this case resulted in the dismissal of the Appellant's claim
for damages.

If the Court rules that it was erroneous to

automatically apply "course of employment" as this term has
evolved in the context of workmen's compensation cases to
negligence cases then it must reverse the trial court's
decision.
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The court must be cognizant of public policy considerations

in deciding

this case.

A rilling which

allows

this decision of trial court to stand wijll preclude

anyone

in the state who is injured in their employer's parking lot
(or otherwise on his premises) from bringing a lawsuit for
negligence.

The

sole

remedy

of

these

individuals

will

be

workmen's compensation.
Workmen's compensation
injured
either

is an inadequate remedy for

individuals because it fails to provide damages for
pain

and

suffering

Individuals who are, forced

or

loss

of

earning

to accept workmen's compensation

are not fully compensated for their injuries.
since workmen's compensation
this
to

remedy

behave

provides
in

is paid

no incentive

careful

capacity.

manner

and

Additionally,

irrespective of fault,

to negligent
to

a^oid

individuals

accidents

and

injuries.
Consequently,

affirmation

of

£he

trial

court's

decision and application of the workmen'? compensation rule
to

negligence

cases

Justice System.
(1)

defeats

the

twin

aims

of

the

Civil

These are:

Fully compensate injured plaintiffs for losses

which are not their fault;
(2)

Deter

negligent misconduct

by forcing

gent individuals to pay for the harm they have caused.
CONCLUSION
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negli-

Appellant asks that this court reverse and overturn
the ruling and order by the Honoraole John Wahlquist dismissing appellant's lawsuit against the respondent.
The

fact

of

the

matter

is

that

"scope

of

employment" has received a very liberal definition in workmen's compensation cases.
definition

To the extent that this liberal

helps compensate

meritorious.

injured

employees

it may be

However, to rigidly and automatically apply

this same definition to a negligence case to keep an injured
person from recovering damages is poor reasoning.
The Appellant had not punched in for the day at the
time of the accident.
employer.

She was not engaged in work for her

She was not in a negligence case.

Workmen's compensation law was devised to compensate injured employees regardless of their fault in causing
an injury.

In return for compensation on a "no-fault"

basis, the injured employee lost his right to claim damages
for "pain and suffering" and other non-economic damages.
The benefits that an injured employee is allowed to claim
are severely limited to benefits provided under Utah lav; by
the Utah Industrial Commission.

Generally speaking, the

employee receives payment of medical expenses and some compensation for time he/she misses from work as a result of
the injury.
Utah Courts have traditionally construed our stat-
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ute in a way so as to provide the maximum amount of coverage
for employees.

In other words, when th^re is doubt about

whether an employee is entitled to coverage, this doubt has
generally

been resolved

in favor of the injured employee.

The idea is that it is better for the ^ployer

to pay an

employee's medical bills than for the injured employee to be
compensated

by

the

taxpayers

through

welfare, and/or rehabilitation.

public

assistance,

A length^ list of Utah case

law supports this view.
In

Z§£iS

Commission,

2i§il

Consolidated

Mirfres

v^

Industrial

36 P.2d 979 (Utah, 1934), th$ court agreed with

this receiving a salary for the time she (spent in the parking lot.

The only thing that brought h^r arguably within

the course of her employment was the fact) that the accident
occurred on her employer's premises.

Appellant should not

lose her right to bring a suit for negligence simply because
she was injured on her employer's premise$.
Respectfully submitted,
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN

O
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HaiA J

MARK H. GOULJ)
Attorney for Appellant
2661 Washington Boulevard
Suite 202
Ogden, Utah 84401
(801) 621-36$2
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this u T\ day of February,
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1987, I mailed four true and correct copies of the above and
foregoing Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid, to Wendell E.
Bennett, Attorney for Respondent, 448 East 400 South, Suite
304, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

MARK H. GOULD
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUfNTY, STATEEOf' UT^H
DOROTHY LYNETTE HOPE,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

\

vs.
RUSSELL C. BERRETT,
Case No.

92546

Defendant.

The defense attorney
Facts,

Conclusions

of

Law,

is invited to submit Findings of
and

Judgment

consistent

with

that

indicated below.
ASSUMED FACTS
For the purposes of this motion], the following facts are
assumed to be true.
1.

Both the plaintiff and th^ defendant were, at the

time in question, employees of the Depaiftment of Defense, on the
installation that is referred to as the Defense Depot in Ogden.
This Depot is a secure military

installation in the sense that

there are armed guards at the gates ahd it requires an appropriate pass before a person may enter.
the Depot by the military.

Traffic is regulated on

The militaty assigns parking spaces

or parking areas to its employees.
2.
in question.

The plaintiff was on her way to work on the morning
She had entered the gatei

- \3> -

She proceeded to her

Page 2
Memorandum Decision
Case No. 92546

parking area, immediately

east of

the administration

building.

She got out of her car and was a pedestrian in the parking area
on the way to her punch in station.
3.

The defendant is also an employee of the Depot.

was also on his route to his work station.
Depot.

He had entered

He

He had entered the

the parking area.

He was driving his

pickup in search of a vacant parking stall.
4.
truck.

The plaintiff was struck by the defendant's pickup

For the purpose of this ruling, the Court will assume

that the defendant driver of the pickup truck negligently struck
the

pedestrian,

even

though

the

Court

recognizes

that

this

allegation is denied, and the defendant does in fact insist the
fault is primarily that of the pedestrian.
5.
clock punch

Neither of the parties have yet reached their time
in station.

Both parties were in the parking

lot

provided for their use.
6.

The plaintiff has filed for her workman1s compensa-

tion benefits.

She has collected them.

The federal decisions

indicates clearly that a person is regarded to be at work when
the

employee

premises.

crosses

the

boundary

line

of

the

employer's

The various cases discussed this view and hold that

their needs to be a fixed line where workman's compensation does
afix.

This could argumentatively be after

the check punch, or

after entry to the building where they are employed, or after

Page 3
Memorandum Decision
Case No- 92546

they reached their assigned parking stalls, or when they enter
onto

the premises.

The federal

rule is clear

that a federal

employee is at work when the federal employee goes through the
gate.

The plaintiff has collected all olf her workman1 s compensa-

tion/ and regardless of whether the parking stall was negligently
designed, etc., or not, the employer is protected from suit.
7.

There can be no question but that the defendant had

also entered onto his employer's premises.
basically controlled by his employer.

He was in an area

The issue is whether or

not he is protected from a negligent sutlt on the theory that he
is a federal employee under workman's compensation.
RULING
This Court believes that the federal

authority

is the

protection to the employer occurred at |the property line.
also has the "property line" rule for (employers.
majority

state

rule.

different rule for
location.

There

the fellow

Workman's

is

little

logical

This is the
support

servants that are forced

compensation

insurance

was

fellow servant's benefit as well as the employer's.
JUDGMENT
The motion for summary judgment lis granted.
DATED this 30

day of October, p.986.

Utah

also

for

a

to the
for

the

REc&VE

WENDELL E. BENNETT
Bar License 00287
Attorney at Law
Attorney for Defendant
448 East 400 South, Suite 304
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
801-532-7846
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
---oooOooo
DOROTHY LYNETTE HOPE,

:

Plaintiff,

:

vs •

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND
JUDGMENT

:

RUSSELL C. BERRETT,

:

Defendant.

Civil No- 92546

:
oooOooo

The above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, District Judge on Friday,
October 10, 1986.

Mark H. Gould appeared on behalf and represented

the interests of the plaintiff Dorothy Lynette Hope.

Wendell E.

Bennett appeared on behalf of-and represented the interests of the
defendant Russell C. Berrett.

Both prior to the hearing and

subsequent thereto, both parties submitted memoranda to the Court
citing authorities relied on by them.

The Court having read and

considered the pre-argument and post-argument memoranda, and having
heard argument by counsel, and being fully advised in the premises,
now makes and enters its findings of fact, conclusions of lav, and
judgment as follows, to wit:

-2FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On October 17, 1984, at approximately 7:15 a.m., the

motor vehicle accident out of which this lawsuit arises occurred.
At said time, both the plaintiff and the defendant were employees
of the United States Government on the military installation that
is commonly known as the Defense Depot in Ogd^n.

The Depot is* a

secure military installation in the sense thatt there are armed
guards at the gates and it requires an appropriate pass before a
person may enter the installation.
Depot by the military.

Traffic i$ regulated on the

The military assigns parking spaces or

parking areas to its employees.
2.

At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was on her

way to work at her assigned work area within the military installation.

She had entered the gate, proceeded t$ her parking area,

exited her car, and was walking toward the Administration Building
where she would punch a time clock and commence her work activities.
3.

The defendant, also an employee at the Defense Depot in

Ogden, had also entered the premises of the Defense Depot in Ogden
through a manned security gate, and was driving his motor vehicle
within the parking lot where he was assigned to park on his way to
his assigned parking stall preparatory to leaving his vehicle,
punching in for work, and commencing his work,.
4.

As both the plaintiff and the defendant were within the

Defense Depot in Ogden secured area, and were in particular in the

-3parking area adjacent to their work station, with the plaintiff
then being a pedestrian, and the defendant then being a driver, a
motor vehicle pedestrian accident occurred between the plaintiff
and the defendant's motor vehicle being operated by the defendant.
The plaintiff claims the defendant was negligent in causing the
motor vehicle pedestrian accident, and the defendant denies that
negligence, and has alleged the plaintiff was negligent in causing
the accident.

For the purposes of the motion for summary judgment,

the question of liability is not material, and is not the basis
for the summary judgment.
5.

Even though neither of the parties had reached their

assigned work station, where they would punch in on a time clock,
or commence their work duties, they were both on the premises of
their common employer, both having entered the secure military
premises through security gates, and were in the near vicinity of
their work station.

The parking lot area is an area assigned by

their employer for their use in parking motor vehicles by which
they arrive at their place of employment.
6.

The plaint iff.has filed for Workman's Compensation

benefits under the Federal Employee's Compensation Act, and has
received those benefits from the Employment Standards Administration, Office of Workman's Compensation Programs, the employer's
Workman's Compensation carrier.
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court makes and
enters the following,

-4CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Under both the State Law of the Stat|e of Utah, and the

applicable law under the Federal Employee's Compensation Act and
the Federal Driver!s Act, and the cases decided! by both the State
Court and the various Federal Courts hold, and |this Court accordingly holds that the Workman's Compensation benefits applied for
by the plaintiff and paid by the employer of the plaintiff and the
defendant is the exclusive remedy in this case,| the accident having
occurred on the employer's premises, even though the employee had
not yet arrived at her work station.

Workman'5 Compensation .being

the exclusive remedy to the plaintiff both as 4gainst her employer,
the United States of America, and her fellow employee, the
defendant Russell C. Berrett, judgment should tye granted to the
defendant Russell C. Berrett on his motion for summary judgment.
JUDGMENT
The Court having made and entered the foregoing findings of
fact and conclusions of law, now
ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES that defendant's motion for
summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff*s complaint with prejudice is hereby granted.
DATED this

/ < ^ d a y of November, 19 8 61.
BY THE COURT:
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